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Cross-border mergers and acquisitions have been very popular in recent times accounting for 45% 
of total merger volume in 2007 (Erel, et al. 2012). These mergers have different characteristics 
from those of domestic mergers due to cross–border effects. In cross border mergers, the 
difference in country–level characteristics between two countries, such as the quality of accounting 
disclosure, culture, geography, corporate governance and bilateral trade are reported to have 
significant roles on the likelihood of cross border mergers (Ahern, et al., forthcoming; Erel et al., 
2012).  
Firms engaging in cross-border mergers can increase their value by acquiring targets in 
countries with weaker governance regimes (Moeller and Schlingemann, 2005; Bris and Cabolis, 
2008; Rossi and Volpin, 2004) or by purchasing targets in related industries (Dos Santos, Errunza 
and Miller, 2008). The opportunity to create value via cross-border mergers can also arise from 
wealth effects and valuation error. Erel et al. (2012) and Froot and Stein (1991) suggest that a 
stronger domestic currency relative to other foreign currencies motivates firms to engage in cross 
border mergers as the price of foreign targets become less expensive. Similarly, when the stock 
price of an acquirer is overvalued, it is more likely to issue shares to acquire (undervalued) targets 
(Shleifer and Vishny, 2003). 
A recent study suggests that mergers can not only create or destroy a firm’s value, but also 
change the firm’s risk. Furfine and Rosen (2011) document that domestic mergers, on average, 
increase default risk of the acquiring firm. They find that idiosyncratic risk, past stock 
performance, valuation error, type of payment and agency problem may explain the increase in 
default risk.  
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The impact of cross-border mergers on the acquiring firms’ default risk however, has not been 
comprehensively examined. Due to different characteristics and determinants of cross border 
mergers from those of domestic merger, the findings on domestic mergers may not be applicable 
to international mergers. In this paper, we extend Furfine and Rosen (2011) by observing the 
effects of cross-border mergers on a firm’s default risk. We find that, in contrast to domestic 
mergers, cross-border mergers reduce default risk. Furthermore, we observe that the determinants 
are mostly different from those in domestic mergers. We find evidence consistent with 
overvaluation of US firms may lead managers to make risk increasing mergers (Shleifer and 
Vishny, 2003). We also find that geographic distance between the two countries and industrial 
diversification affects default risk. National culture has negative but limited relations with default 
risk. However, consistent with Furfine and Rosen (2011), we find that idiosyncratic risk is 
positively related to default risk. Finally, we find that mergers financed with shares are negatively 
related to default risk, but these relations are not statistically significant.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we describe our data and 
methodology. In section 3, we report the results of our empirical study. Our conclusions are 
offered in the final section.  
 
2. Methodology and Data  
2.1 Methodology 
 
According to Merton (1974) bond pricing model, the market value of a firm’s assets follows a 
Brownian motion: 
        VdWVdtdV v                                                                                                             (1) 
where V is the firm’s asset value,  is the expected continuously compounded return on V, v is 
the volatility of firm value and dW is a standard Wiener process. The market value of equity, E, is: 
            )()( 21 dFedVE
rT                                                                                                        (2) 
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where F is the face value of the firm’s debt, r is the risk free rate and N is the cumulative density 
function of the standard normal distribution, d1 is given by: 








                                                                                               (3) 
where T is one year, and d2 is Td v1  
The volatility of the firm and its equity: 
           vE dE
V  )( 1

                                                                                                                (4) 
The distance to default is calculated as: 






 )5.0()/ln( 2                                                                                             (5) 
and the implied probability of default is: 
          )( DD                                                                                                                          (6) 
 
Using the naïve version of the Merton (1974) DD model, Bharath and Shumway (2008) 
report that their distance to default model is superior in hazard models and in out of sample 
forecasts than the existing models. Thus, we follow Bharath and Shumway (2008) in measuring 
probability of default risk1. We measure F as total current liabilities plus one half of long term debt 
(Bharath and Shumway, 2008; Vassalou and Xing, 2004).  E is the market capital of the firm’s 
equity. The volatility of each firm’s debt is estimated as: 
 
v = (E/(E+F)E + F/(E+F)D)                                                                                             (7)  
   
where D is 0.05 + 0.25E and E is the annualized percent standard deviation of returns, estimated 
from thirteen months to one month prior to the merger announcement. Bharath and Shumway 
                                                 
1 See Bharath and Shumway (2008) for detailed explanation of their model. 
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(2008) use the firm’s stock return over the previous year (rit-1) as the proxy for the expected return 
on the firm’s assets (). Thus, the distance to default is estimated as: 






 )5.0(]/)ln[( 21                                                                                    (8)  
and that the probability of default is:                               
          )( DD                                                                                                                          (9) 
                                
We use independent variables that are reported to have significant effects on default risk in 
mergers and as determinants in cross-border mergers. Furfine and Rosen (2011) suggest that 
idiosyncratic risk, valuation errors proxied by past stock performance and market to book ratio, 
firm size and type of payment have significant impact on default risk in domestic mergers. They 
find that idiosyncratic risk increases default risk in domestic mergers. Following Furfine and 
Rosen (2011) we measure idiosyncratic risk (VOL) as the standard deviation of the idiosyncratic 
component of the acquirer’s stock return estimated over the six month period ending one month 
prior to the merger announcement. Inconsistent with the overvaluation hypothesis, Furfine and 
Rosen find that acquirers with poor past stock performance tend to make risk enhancing domestic 
mergers. Following their methodology, our proxies for valuation errors are the buy and hold return 
of an acquirer’s stock in the 12 months ending at the end of the month prior to the merger 
announcement in excess of the market index (S&P 500) return over the same period (RUNM) and 
Tobin’s q. Market size (MKTVAL) is calculated as the natural logarithm of market capitalization 
and we use a dummy for mergers financed at least with stocks (SHARES). In addition, we also use 
a dummy if the acquirer’s industry is the same as the target firm’s industry (RELATED). 
Erel et al. (2012) examine the determinants of cross-border mergers and acquisitions. They 
find that geography, the quality of accounting disclosure, and bilateral trade increase the likelihood 
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of mergers between two countries. They also indicate that cultural differences2 play insignificant 
role in cross border mergers which is in stark odds with a recent study (Ahern et al., forthcoming).    
Ahern et al. (forthcoming) examine the role of national cultural values on the pattern of cross-
border merger activity and the gains they create. Using a comprehensive sample of 20,893 cross-
border mergers from 52 different countries over 1991–2008, they find that culture has a significant 
and economically important effect on the volume of cross-border mergers. After controlling for 
country-level fixed effects and a range of country-pair variables such as shared legal origin, 
language, religion, geographic distance they find a strong negative relationship between cultural 
distance and the volume of cross-border merger activity between two countries. Particularly, the 
greater is the cross-country difference between the values of trust, hierarchy, and individualism, 
the smaller is the cross-border merger volume. Likewise, less cultural distance leads to higher 
combined announcement returns in cross-border mergers. Overall, the work of Ahern et al. 
(forthcoming) is consistent with the view that cultural differences impose costly frictions between 
firms leading to fewer mergers.  
We control for country-level corporate governance mechanisms, such as the revised 
antidirector index (ANTIDIR), legal origin (ORIGIN), ownership concentration (OWN), stock 
market capitalization to GDP (STOCKMKTDEV), law enforcement index (ENFORCE), and 
accounting standards, such as the time to collect bounced checks (CHECK), prospectus disclosure 
index (DISC) and periodic filing index (DISCFIL), from Djankov, La Porta, Lopez De Silanes and 
Shleifer (2008). We also include the distance between the capital cities of a country pair (GEO).    
We use the uncertainty avoidance score (UAI) from Hofstede (1980, 2001) as our proxy for 
natural cultural value. Uncertainty avoidance is one of the facets of natural cultural attributes 
constructed by Hofstede. Hofstede’s uncertainty avoidance score has been used in finance by 
several scholarly works (Beugelsdijk and Frijns, 2010 and Anderson et al., 2011) in their studies 
on the determinants of the home bias. These studies show that institutional investors from high 
                                                 
2 They have different measures of culture variables than Ahern et al.  
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uncertainty avoidance countries invest less in foreign equities, which may be supported by the 
belief that investors may perceive foreign assets to be more risky and hence do not invest in them. 
Venaik and Brewer (2010) posit that Hofstede’s uncertainty avoidance score principally 
measures the stress component of dealing with uncertain situations. Hofstede (2001) states that 
‘uncertainty avoiding cultures shun ambiguous situations. People in such cultures look for 
structure in their organizations, institutions and relationships, which makes events clearly 
interpretable and predictable’. He constructed the uncertainty avoidance score using three specific 
survey questions.  These are: 
1. How often do you feel nervous or tense (at work)? (1. Always to 5. Never). 
2. How long do you think you will continue working for this company (or organization)? (1. Two 
year to 5. Until retirement).  
3. Company rules should not be broken – even when the employee thinks it is in the company’s 
best interest. (1. Strongly agree to 5. Strongly disagree). 
These questions basically capture three features of uncertainty avoidance which are rule 
orientation, employment stability and stress. Responses from these questions are combined into 
one single measure of uncertainty avoidance.  
 
Our industry and year fixed effect regression model is the following: 
DMUt = α + βRUNMt + βVOLt + βQt + βLEVt + βSHARESt + βLNGEOt + βLNMKTVALt  
              + βRELATEDt  + βDUAIt + βDDANTIDIRt + βDDORIGINt  + βDDCHECKt  
              + βDDSTOCKMKTDEVt + βDDDISCt + βDDDISCFILt  
              + βDDENFORCEt + Industry dummy + Year dummy + εt        
 
 
Definition of Variables: 
 
DMU is the change in distance to default probability calculate following Bharath and Shumway 
(2008) DD model.  
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RUNM is the buy and hold return of an acquirer’s stock in the 12 months ending at the end of the 
month prior to the merger announcement in excess of the market index (S&P 500) return over the 
same period.  
VOL is the standard deviation of the idiosyncratic component of the acquirer’s stock return.  
Q is Tobin’s q.  
LEV is leverage ratio.  
SHARES is a dummy variable is the merger is financed at least partially with stock.  
LNGEO is the natural logarithm of the distance between the acquirer’s country and target’s 
country.  
LNMKTVAL is the natural logarithm of the market value of the acquiring firm at the end of the 
month prior to merger announcement.  
RELATED is a dummy variable if the target’s industry is the same as the acquirer’s industry.  
DUAI is the difference between the Uncertainty Avoidance Index which is a Hofstede’s culture 
variable, of the acquirer’s country and that of the target’s country.   
DDANTIDIR is a dummy variable if the difference between antidirector index of the acquirer’s 
country is the same or greater than that of the target’s country.   
DDORIGIN is a dummy variable if the difference between the code for country origin of the 
acquirer’s country is the same or greater than that of the target’s country.   
DDCHECK is a dummy variable if the difference between the time to collect bounced checks in 
the acquirer’s country is the same or greater than that of the target’s country.    
DDSTOCKMKTDEV is a dummy variable if the difference between stock market development 
index of the acquirer’s country is the same or greater than that of the target’s country.   
DDDISC is a dummy variable if the difference between prospectus disclosure index of the 
acquirer’s country is the same or greater than that of the target’s country.  
DDDISCFIL is a dummy variable if the difference between disclosure in periodic filling index of 
the acquirer’s country is the same or greater than that of the target’s country.   
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DDENFORCE is a dummy variable if the difference between public enforcement index of the 
acquirer’s country is the same or greater than that of the target’s country.    
 
 2.2 Data 
 
We collect cross-border mergers data from Zephyr database. Following Furfine and Rosen 
(2011), we select only complete deals with minimum ownership of 90%, cash and shares 
acquisition and mergers in non-financial and non-utility industries for the period from 1997 to 
2011. From Zephyr, we obtain the announcement dates, types of payment and industry of 
acquirers and target firms. Firm financial data are obtained from Osiris database and stock return 
data are taken from Datastream. We use data from Osiris and Datstream to measure proxies for 
idiosyncratic risk (VOL), valuation errors (RUNM and M/B ratio), leverage (LEV) and market 
value (MKTVAL). We obtain data on country level governance and accounting standards such as 
the revised antidirector index (ANTIDIR), country of origin (ORIGIN), time to collect bounced 
checks (CHECK), ownership concentration (OWN), stock market development 
(SOCKMKTDEV), prospectus disclosure index (DISC), periodic filling index (DISCFIL) and 
enforcement index (ENFORCE) from Djankov et al. (2008). We acquire data on national culture 
(UAI) from Hofstede’s website. Following Erel et al. (2012), we calculate the distance between 
capital cities of a country pair (GEO) from mapsofworld.com. After merging these samples and 
dropping the missing observations, we winsorise all the independent variables at the 1% and 99% 
level of their values to mitigate the effects of outliers. Our final sample consists of 1,407 firm year 
observations.  
 
3. Empirical Results  
We provide descriptive statistics of our sample in Table 1. We find that default risk decreases after 
cross-border mergers. This result is inconsistent with Furfine and Rosen (2011) but consistent with 
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Leland (2007). Also, most mergers are related mergers and are cash transactions. The median 
geographic distance between headquarters of US acquirers and targets is approximately 3,800 
miles. Targets countries typically have higher uncertainty avoidance scores antidirector index 
values than US. Targets countries are generally from similar legal origin as the US. Typically, it 
takes longer to collect bounced checks in target countries than acquirer countries.  In general, the 
acquiring country (US) has a better developed stock market and has higher disclosure indices than 
target countries.  
In table 2, we report the correlation between key variables used in the study. Most 
correlation values, except for country-level governance variables, are small and do not have a 
potential for multicollinearity.  The strong correlations among country-level governance variables 
preclude us from using these variables simultaneously in our multiple regressions.    
We regress the change in default risk measured by DMU, the change in distance to default 
probability, on a number of independent variables capturing firm specific factors, culture, 
geographic distance and institutional quality.  The results for the total sample are provided in 
Table 3, while subsample results are reported in Table 3.  The results from Table 3 reveal several 
interesting findings. First, it appears that idiosyncratic risk (VOL), managerial issues (RUNM) and 
geographic distance (LNGEO) significantly affect the post-merger default risk in the case of cross-
border mergers. Consistent with the overvaluation hypothesis, firms with good past stock 
performance are likely to engage in risky acquisitions. The positive VOL is consistent with the 
notion that high idiosyncratic risk means high information asymmetry which result in more 
inefficient mergers that increase default risk. Geographic distance between the two countries is 
positively related to default risk. Second, firm size (LNMKTVAL) does not seem to have any 
significant effect on post-merger default risk and the difference in culture (DUAI) has limited 
impact on default risk. The results also show that institutional quality does not have any significant 




4. Conclusion  
In this paper, we examine the impact of cross-border acquisitions on post-merger default risk. Our 
major finding is that managerial factors and geographic distance do play significant roles in 
affecting post-merger default risk. In contrast to the findings of Furfine and Rosen (2011) we find 
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MEAN SD MIN 1Q MEDIAN 3Q MAX
DMU ‐0.009 0.080 ‐0.508 ‐0.244 0.000 0.297 0.483
RUNM  0.010 0.082 ‐0.207 ‐0.204 0.006 0.258 0.259
VOL 0.019 0.009 0.007 0.007 0.017 0.052 0.054
GEO (Miles) 3,667 1,875 458 458 3,835 9,917 9,917
MKTVAL (US$ th) 18,209,133 47,559,564 43,825 43,825 2,641,302 277,060,300 277,060,300
TOBIN 2.422 1.564 0.761 0.767 1.962 9.130 9.165
SHARES 0.085 0.280 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000
LEV 0.655 0.862 0.000 0.000 0.435 5.107 5.312
RELATED 0.619 0.486 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
UAI ‐7.691 20.117 ‐48.000 ‐48.000 ‐2.000 23.000 23.000
DANTIDIR ‐0.952 1.002 ‐2.000 ‐2.000 ‐1.000 2.000 2.000
DORIGIN 0.483 0.500 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000
DCHECK ‐1.118 0.700 ‐2.594 ‐2.510 ‐1.048 0.325 0.325
DSTOCKMKTDEV 35.534 51.012 ‐106.818 ‐106.818 35.960 125.746 125.746
DDISC  0.321 0.233 0.080 0.080 0.250 1.000 1.000
DDISCFIL 0.212 0.271 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.800 0.800
DENFORCE ‐0.458 0.445 ‐1.000 ‐1.000 ‐0.500 0.000 0.000  
DMU  is the change  in distance to default probability. RUNM  is the buy and hold return of an acquirer’s 
stock in the 12 months ending at the end of the month prior to the merger announcement in excess of the 



















RUNM  VOL GEO (MilesKTVAL (US$ t TOBIN SHARES LEV RELATED UAI DANTIDIR DORIGIN DCHECK TOCKMKTD DDISC  DDISCFIL
VOL ‐0.062
GEO (Miles) ‐0.009 0.047
MKTVAL (US$ th 0.033 ‐0.213 0.046
TOBIN 0.061 ‐0.071 ‐0.084 0.263
SHARES 0.007 0.357 ‐0.034 0.074 0.067
LEV ‐0.033 ‐0.112 ‐0.011 0.117 ‐0.137 0.021
RELATED 0.008 ‐0.012 0.049 ‐0.096 ‐0.082 ‐0.035 0.023
UAI 0.063 ‐0.131 ‐0.106 0.108 0.018 ‐0.011 0.022 ‐0.076
DANTIDIR 0.007 0.082 0.120 ‐0.027 ‐0.042 0.071 0.019 ‐0.001 ‐0.414
DORIGIN ‐0.006 0.053 0.300 ‐0.028 ‐0.030 ‐0.028 ‐0.026 0.077 ‐0.636 0.684
DCHECK 0.014 ‐0.052 0.346 0.041 ‐0.051 ‐0.073 ‐0.008 ‐0.047 0.302 ‐0.282 0.045
DSTOCKMKTDEV 0.005 0.167 0.105 ‐0.026 ‐0.068 0.059 ‐0.005 0.044 ‐0.587 0.423 0.515 ‐0.371
DDISC  0.002 0.091 0.410 0.044 ‐0.099 0.012 0.009 0.086 ‐0.389 0.554 0.738 0.057 0.568
DDISCFIL 0.021 0.016 0.224 ‐0.059 ‐0.066 ‐0.020 ‐0.015 0.119 ‐0.420 0.387 0.734 0.030 0.451 0.727
DENFORCE ‐0.009 ‐0.050 0.332 0.043 0.007 0.003 0.026 ‐0.065 0.330 ‐0.220 ‐0.190 0.601 ‐0.417 ‐0.123 ‐0.334  





the difference between antidirector  index of the acquirer’s country and that of the target’s country.   DORIGIN  is the difference between the code for country origin of the 
acquirer’s country and that of the target’s country.   DCHECK  is the difference between the time to collect bounced checks  in the acquirer’s country and that of the target’s 








RUNM  0.181***  0.181***  0.183***  0.180***  0.180***  0.182***  0.182***  0.182***  0.181*** 
(0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
VOL  1.856***  1.870***  1.839***  1.900***  1.812***  1.866***  1.848***  1.885***  1.735*** 
(0.002)  (0.002)  (0.003)  (0.002)  (0.003)  (0.002)  (0.003)  (0.002)  (0.005) 
Q  ‐0.002  ‐0.002  ‐0.001  ‐0.002  ‐0.002  ‐0.002  ‐0.002  ‐0.002  ‐0.002 
(0.529)  (0.526)  (0.596)  (0.409)  (0.550)  (0.519)  (0.532)  (0.497)  (0.592) 
LEV  0.002  0.002  0.003  0.003  0.002  0.002  0.002  0.002  0.002 
(0.629)  (0.613)  (0.587)  (0.557)  (0.664)  (0.621)  (0.626)  (0.659)  (0.660) 
SHARES  ‐0.010  ‐0.010  ‐0.010  ‐0.010  ‐0.011  ‐0.010  ‐0.010  ‐0.010  ‐0.014 
(0.507)  (0.534)  (0.497)  (0.516)  (0.489)  (0.516)  (0.509)  (0.530)  (0.367) 
GEO  0.009*  0.010*  0.014**  0.011**  0.009*  0.010*  0.010*  0.012**  0.022*** 
(0.062)  (0.059)  (0.032)  (0.030)  (0.061)  (0.092)  (0.078)  (0.026)  (0.004) 
MKTVAL  0.004  0.004  0.004  0.004  0.004  0.004  0.004  0.004  0.004 
(0.119)  (0.119)  (0.121)  (0.113)  (0.130)  (0.115)  (0.122)  (0.129)  (0.156) 
RELATED  ‐0.015*  ‐0.016*  ‐0.015*  ‐0.016**  ‐0.015*  ‐0.015*  ‐0.015*  ‐0.016**  ‐0.015* 
(0.059)  (0.057)  (0.063)  (0.044)  (0.063)  (0.061)  (0.063)  (0.044)  (0.062) 
DUAI  ‐0.014  ‐0.015*  ‐0.023*  ‐0.018**  ‐0.008  ‐0.015  ‐0.015  ‐0.002  ‐0.006 
(0.102)  (0.095)  (0.050)  (0.044)  (0.511)  (0.109)  (0.128)  (0.822)  (0.675) 
DDANTIDIR  ‐0.004    0.024 
(0.697)    (0.101) 
DORIGIN  ‐0.013    ‐0.031 
(0.262)    (0.066) 
DDCHECK  ‐0.032*    ‐0.027 
(0.060)    (0.205) 
DDSTOCKMKTDEV  0.009    0.019 
(0.461)    (0.225) 
DDISC  ‐0.006    ‐0.008 
(0.774)    (0.806) 
DDISCFIL    ‐0.004    0.002 
  (0.820)    (0.932) 
DDENFORCE    ‐0.019*  ‐0.021 
  (0.079)  (0.171) 
 
Year Effects  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y 
Industry Effects  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y 
 
N  375  375  375  375  375  375  375  375  375 
R‐squared  0.260  0.260  0.263  0.268  0.261  0.260  0.260  0.267  0.281 
The dependent variable  is DMU, defined as the change  in distance to default probability. RUNM  is 
the buy and hold return of an acquirer’s stock in the 12 months ending at the end of the month prior 
to the merger announcement in excess of the market index (S&P 500) return over the same period. 












country and  that of  the  target’s  country.   DDCHECK  is a dummy  variable of one  if  the difference 
between  the  time  to collect bounced checks  in  the acquirer’s country  is  the same or greater  than 
that of the target’s country, else zero. DDSTOCKMKTDEV is a dummy variable of one if the difference 
between stock market development index of the acquirer’s country is the same or greater than that 
of  the  target’s country, else zero.   DDISC  is  the difference between prospectus disclosure  index of 
the acquirer’s country and that of the target’s country. DDISCFIL is the difference between disclosure 
in periodic  filling  index of  the acquirer’s country and that of the target’s country. DDENFORCE  is a 
dummy variable of one if the difference between public enforcement index of the acquirer’s country 
is the same or greater than that of the target’s country, else zero.    
*, **, *** are significance at 10%, 5%, 1% respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
